AN EXCLUSIVE Portfolio 1

July was a good month for my investments. Net worth increased moderately. High income produced excellent savings and the main component of my mortgage repayments combined with reasonable gains on my equities and commodities and the impact of an additional decline in the AUD was offset by the rise in the NZD.

1. my Hong Kong collateral portfolio appreciated. The month During, there were no new buys (although Fairwood purchased at the end of June only arrived in July). I keep shares in CMR which is suspended pursuing an assault by a short seller alleging fraud currently. 4. my commodities increased. 5. most of my properties were occupied with all tenants paying on time.

Unfortunately, I’ve lots of small repair expenses which have to be paid, as well as the price of repainting etc on a change of tenants and the associated agency fee. 10. there have been no transfers to Mrs Traineeinvestor this month. My cash position rose slightly with money coming in than venturing out due to new investments.

  • ► Jul 07 (1)
  • If possible, have tie-up or alliance with a local operator
  • When government taxes, the multiplier works in change
  • User statistics

I currently keep 57.02 weeks of expenditures in HKD cash or equivalents. That is above my target floor of two years. Month period For the one, my net worthy of rose by 3.03%. The entire year to day increase is 5.83%. This means that my investments have lost a small amount money this year. Sept My pension day has been fixed for 30.

The pool, however, was a variety of mortgages of varying quality.” it was left from the designers to the rating firms to determine the price of the security. But no formula was experienced by the rating agencies because of this task. They assigned ratings to complex securities as if they were ordinary corporate bonds. And these ratings overstated the value of the securities and were fundamentally arbitrary. According to Brunnermeier “rating at the advantage” might also have contributed to favorable ratings of organised products versus corporate and business bonds.

Fund managers, “searching for yield,” were drawn to buying organized products because they guaranteed high expected comes back with a little possibility of catastrophic loss. Furthermore, some finance managers may have preferred the relatively illiquid junior tranches precisely because they traded so infrequently and were therefore hard to value. These managers will make their monthly results appear attractively easy as time passes because they had some flexibility in regards to to when they could revalue their portfolios.

As information flowed about the indegent quality of the underlying assets, the markets became progressively weary about CDOs and their tranches. The prices of some tranches of debt fell by 30 % in a few months. Instead of booking profits, banks were confronted with the probability of write downs. Yet few expected the quantum of the write downs. Only as banks like UBS, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley started to announce big losses during the second half of 2007, the magnitude of the crisis became more evident.